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Transparency Proposals for European Sovereign Bond Markets 
Peter G. Dunne* 
 
he debate over the possible extension of transparency regulation in Europe to include sovereign bonds has opened up 
a number of other issues in need of serious consideration. One such issue is the appropriateness of the entire 
infrastructure supporting the trading of European sovereign bonds. In recent years, sovereign issuers have supported 
the development of an electronic inter-dealer market but have remained unconcerned about the opacity of dealer-to-
customer trading. The degree of segmentation in this market is high relative to what exists in nearly all other financial 
markets. This paper explores why European sovereign bond markets have developed in such a segmented way and considers 
how this structure could be altered to improve transparency without adversely affecting liquidity, efficiency or the benefits 
enjoyed by primary dealers and issuers. It is suggested that the structure of the market could be improved greatly if the 
largest and most active investors were permitted access to the inter-dealer electronic trading platforms. This would solve a 
number of market imperfections and increase the proportion of market activity that is conducted in a transparent way. The 
paper argues that sovereign issuers in Europe have the means to provide incentives that would influence dealers to support 
reduced segmentation. Some practical examples of how this could be achieved are provided and the potential benefits are 
outlined. 
 
1. Introduction 
Due mainly to regulatory activity, financial market 
transparency has become the subject of much recent 
interest within the finance industry as well as in academic 
circles. The word ‘transparency’ is used in this context to 
mean how visible market activity and prices are. Regulation 
in this area is usually aimed at increasing transparency and 
regulatory intervention usually reflects a view that, when 
left unregulated, a sub-optimal level of transparency is 
chosen by Self Regulatory Organisations. The term 
‘increased transparency’ can be used to imply that prices 
and traded quantities are made observable to a wider 
audience than before. It may also mean that more sensitive 
details about trades are revealed, or that information is 
revealed more quickly than before. 
Pre-trade transparency requires that customers and/or their 
agents have access to publicly observable ‘firm’ quotes at 
which they can expect to trade. Post-trade transparency 
concerns the dissemination of information about recently 
obtained prices (and could include information about 
quantity traded). Such information can assist investors in 
comparing the prices they obtained in their recent trades 
with that achieved by other investors, and this kind of 
transparency can act as a motivation to agents acting on 
behalf of clients to provide what is known as ‘best 
execution’.
2 Perhaps of more fundamental importance, 
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however, is the fact that pre-trade, and particularly post-
trade, transparency can have significant effects on 
information asymmetry within the market, and can 
therefore change behaviour of participants in ways that 
may, or may not, be beneficial to market quality.  
The main objection to excessive transparency comes from 
agents who provide liquidity to investors on-demand. These 
agents regard a degree of opacity as necessary for the safe 
unwinding of large, unwanted positions. They argue that 
excessive transparency would raise the risks of providing 
liquidity on-demand and reduce the supply of liquidity 
services and therefore reduce the quality of the market.  
This is the subject of an extensive academic literature that 
has recently been contributed to and surveyed by Biais et 
al. (2006) and Dunne et al. (2006).
3 This literature is 
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divided on whether the effects of such regulation are 
unambiguously positive. It should also be recognised that it 
is sometimes difficult to assess the effects of regulation 
alongside the effects of improvements in trading 
technology, which can also be credited with improving the 
dissemination of pre- and post-trade information as well as 
adding to market liquidity and raising efficiency. 
There is a significant recent history of regulatory initiatives 
in financial markets in respect of transparency.
4 And 
regulation of transparency is an area in which regulators 
have claimed some success in terms of improving market 
quality and liquidity. While this paper focuses on euro-
denominated sovereign bond markets, it is worthwhile 
considering how transparency regulation has developed 
elsewhere and in other financial markets. The most pro-
active regulator has been the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the US. The SEC has been 
particularly active in regulating transparency of the 
National Market System for equities and in the corporate 
bond market (see Box 1). Developments in these markets 
have prompted the SEC, and other regulators, to extend 
their horizons.  
Box 1. Transparency initiatives undertaken by the SEC 
Equity market transparency regulation in the United States 
has been heavily influenced by the amendments to the 
Exchange Act in 1975 where Congress directed the SEC to 
facilitate the development of a National Market System for 
the trading of equity securities. Congress set out goals for 
this system that included; efficient execution of 
transactions, fair competition, the availability of quote and 
trade information to market participants, best-execution of 
investors’ orders and the opportunity for investor orders to 
be executed without dealer intervention. The SEC has been 
relatively consistent in pursuing these goals and these 
principles have been echoed by other regulators ever since.  
A recent example of SEC activity is Rule 605, adopted in 
November 2000, which required market centres to make 
monthly public disclosure of execution quality of its 
members. According to Zhao & Chung (2006), this led to 
significant improvements in execution quality. 
Transparency regulation in the US has also been tried in the 
case of corporate bond markets. Following pressure from 
the SEC, a transparency initiative called the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) was 
introduced in an experimental way in the US corporate bond 
market in July 2002, and has been credited with attracting 
increased retail investor involvement and improving 
liquidity.  
The SEC has been somewhat less pro-active in directly 
regulating the US Treasury market but even here an 
industry-led initiative, known as GovPX, was implemented 
in the early 1990s. In the UK gilt market, the issuer has 
been very cautious in its approach to such regulation. In the 
late 1990s, after a delicate consultation process with market 
participants, the UK Debt Management Office (DMO) 
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introduced a formal segmentation of trading arrangements. 
In the inter-dealer segment, gilt-edged market makers 
(GEMS) were allowed to operate with very limited 
transparency of their activities beyond the boundaries of the 
inter-dealer space. Trading activity in the dealer-to-
customer segment also remained quite opaque.  
In the euro-denominated sovereign bond markets, issuers 
have also been careful in their approach to transparency. 
Many of the smaller European issuers have imposed 
obligations on primary dealers that have resulted in some 
improvement in transparency in the inter-dealer market. 
There is still quite limited transparency of the dealer-to-
customer market, however. 
In Europe, the next phase of transparency will be imposed 
by the regulatory aspects of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) from 1 November 2007. 
Initially, these will be put into effect by the national 
regulators for equity trading, which will be subjected to 
quite stringent pre- and post-trade transparency 
requirements.  
It remains to be seen whether the effects of these 
requirements will be positive, but Article 65(1) of MiFID 
has now shifted the transparency debate to other markets 
where the benefits of transparency are regarded as more 
difficult to confirm. Article 65(1) called for a report from 
the European Commission in relation to the adequacy of the 
level of pre- and post-trade transparency in classes of 
financial assets other than equities. The corporate and 
sovereign bond markets are now the main focus of 
attention, and judging by the responses to the 
Commission’s consultation calls, there seems to be little 
appetite among market participants for increased pre- and 
post-trade transparency in these cases.
5 
The target of MiFID-style transparency regulation is mainly 
‘off-exchange’ and ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) trading. It is 
easy to see why fixed-income asset markets come into the 
view of regulators as very suitable targets for such 
regulation. After all, off-exchange and OTC trading in 
bonds is much more prevalent than it is in the case of 
equities. Many of the publicly available responses to the 
Commission’s consultation process on extending MiFID to 
fixed-income markets place considerable emphasis on the 
differences between equity and bond markets, and argue 
that these differences either negate the need for similar 
regulation or make such regulation unsuitable and perhaps 
even damaging to market quality. While this may be a valid 
argument, there has been a tendency to take the current 
bond market structure (and its difference from the equity 
market) as a given. There is a lack of analysis of the deeper 
issue as to why these markets differ and whether 
transparency itself can partly explain the structural 
differences. 
The next section of this paper – Section 2 – examines the 
relevant differences between equity, corporate and 
sovereign bond markets in general and considers the forces 
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that have brought about the current structure of the euro-
denominated bond market in particular. This concludes 
with the view that the structure of bond markets in general 
is significantly different from that in equity markets and 
this is likely to affect how transparency regulation impacts 
on the quality of the market. It also highlights the potential 
for considerable conflict between the Commission and 
sovereign issuers regarding the appropriateness of 
transparency regulation because issuers have an interest in 
maintaining the existing structure and can make a ‘second 
best’ argument for the status-quo.  
Section 3 of the paper makes tentative proposals that, it is 
argued, would reduce the segmentation of this market. If 
implemented, the proposal would result in dealers 
competing with each other for investor trades in a common 
transparent setting. This involves widening access to the 
electronic inter-dealer market. It would require changes to 
the incentive structure underlying primary dealer behaviour 
and also some slight modifications to both platform-design 
and management. These proposals arise as a direct result of 
the detailed examination of the current structure and its 
causes. They are not excessively detailed but provide a 
blueprint for realistic policies that are more likely to 
improve market transparency and efficiency than would a 
direct application of MiFID-style regulation.  
2.  The structure of European sovereign bond 
markets 
An initial step in gaining an insight into the peculiarities of 
the European sovereign bond market is to recognize that, in 
general, fixed income markets are substantially different 
from equity and most other financial markets (this is 
addressed in the extant literature by Gravelle, 2004). An 
important difference (from the point of view of 
transparency regulation) between equity and fixed-income 
markets arises from the fact that intermediation in the bond 
markets is mostly carried out by dealers who act as 
principals and deal ‘for-their-own-account’.  Their clients 
are generally well-informed professionals. In contrast, in 
equity markets, intermediation is more likely to be 
facilitated by brokers acting on behalf of customers who are 
often not professionals. Thus, there is a greater prevalence 
of dealers providing liquidity ‘on-request’ in the bond 
market. 
Although not exclusively the case, intermediation in the 
equity market is more likely to be concerned with finding 
liquidity or simply matching trades against available limit 
orders on an electronic order-book. Since bonds are usually 
traded in very large amounts, dealers frequently take 
temporary possession of large bond positions and this 
exposes them to significant inventory risk. In contrast, 
inventory risk is not as acute for intermediaries in the 
equity market. 
Probably a more important difference between equity and 
fixed-income markets is the fact that the latter tend to be 
more segmented into inter-dealer (B2B) and dealer-to-
client (B2C) parts than is commonly true of equity markets. 
It is also arguably the case that dealer-to-client relations are 
more exclusive in bond markets, with customers displaying 
considerable loyalty to their chosen dealer. This makes 
dealer-to-client trading inherently less transparent.  
While it not uncommon for financial asset markets to be 
segmented into dealer-to-customer (the so-called B2C 
market) and dealer-to-dealer (B2B) parts, the degree to 
which it applies in the euro-denominated sovereign bond 
market is rather strict. In the euro-denominated sovereign 
bond markets electronic order-books are in operation, but 
only in the inter-dealer segment of the market where 
liquidity is provided by dealers acting as principals on their 
own accounts.  
As a contrast, in equity markets, e.g., Euronext Paris or 
SETS in London, investors can indirectly contribute to 
order-book liquidity by way of ‘limit-orders’ (or one-sided 
quotes) through their broker. An electronic order-book 
aggregates and distributes all prices (and quantities) at 
which agents are willing to trade and this provides a high 
degree of transparency. In most cases, these electronic 
venues allow agents to electronically execute trades 
remotely against the available prices quoted. 
While fixed-income markets differ from equity markets it is 
also the case that sovereign bond markets are quite different 
from corporate bond markets. This is due to the fact that, in 
sovereign markets, issuers (governments or their agents) 
have largely dictated how the primary and secondary 
markets are structured. This is because, as Martinez-Resano 
(2005) has highlighted, sovereign issuers employ primary 
dealer systems and are monopsonistic buyers of liquidity 
services. As a result, they can exert a great deal of pressure 
on dealers to behave in a way that is beneficial to issuers.  
The B2B-B2C division of the euro-denominated bond 
market arises in part from historical accident but it is very 
likely that it is perpetuated by the policy of issuers in 
employing primary dealer systems (PDS). Because bonds 
are usually designed with a finite-life to maturity, issuers 
rely heavily on primary dealers to regularly distribute new 
issues of bonds to the investor community. Clients are 
dependent on good supply from their dealers and dealers 
are driven by various forces to maintain a steady flow of 
secondary market business from their clients.  
It is difficult to be certain about cause-and-effect in 
maintaining the B2B-B2C segmentation, but once it is in 
place the following propositions are likely to be 
supportable: i) issuers are better-off distributing new bond 
issues through dealers rather than to investors directly, ii) 
dealers are better-off building and maintaining a client base 
that is large enough to warrant the risk exposure they enter 
into by providing liquidity on the secondary inter-dealer 
bond market and iii) clients are better-off routing most of 
their order flow through one dealer because they can expect 
better execution when they assist their dealer in keeping 
trading positions hidden from competing dealers. While 
this system is probably self-perpetuating it is also 
inconsistent with full-blown transparency in either, or both, 
segments of the market.  
There are a number of other peculiarities of the market 
structure that add nuance to this argument. For example, the 
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regular voice communication with a network of clients 
because it is easier to plan distributions when client 
demands are better understood. Voice communication in a 
repetitive trading situation also contributes to building trust 
and commitment. But voice communication is almost 
always bilateral and therefore, much of the trading in bonds 
ends up being opaque. 
The inconsistency of the current bond market structure and 
transparency also reflects the dependence of the issuer on 
the services of primary dealers and vice-versa. The 
regularity and speed with which issuers need to distribute 
new issues dictates that there is heavy reliance on dealers. 
But dealers also become dependent on their own successful 
participation in primary auctions and in syndicated issues.
6 
Dealers taking a bigger proportion of new issues at primary 
auctions become the source of a reliable supply for a bigger 
client base (or a client base made up predominantly from 
the largest investors in the market).  
Issuers can take advantage of the fact that most primary 
dealers must participate well in primary auctions in order to 
properly maintain their client base. Privileged access to 
primary supply is frequently only one part of a typical 
relationship between sovereign issuers and primary dealers. 
The other part involves the extraction of commitments from 
dealers to provide secondary market liquidity on the inter-
dealer electronic platforms.  
In the case of smaller European issuers, dealers often enter 
into obligations that require them to quote relatively small 
maximum bid-offer spreads for relatively large minimum 
quantities for as long as five hours a day. These 
commitments are entered into with no guarantee that 
sufficient customer transactions will be available to make 
the activity worthwhile. This in turn exerts great pressure 
on dealers to compete with each other for client business. 
Dealers are more likely to compete with each other to win 
clients rather than to win individual transactions (although 
the latter does occur on request-for-quote platforms). 
Dealers obtain a positive externality when an issuer 
imposes obligations on a significant number of dealing 
banks. This is because such obligations make it easier to 
place unwanted inventories if necessary. In the absence of 
widespread obligations, no single dealer would be willing 
to provide such a degree of liquidity unilaterally because 
the associated risks would be excessively high. 
The segmented structure of the market is also perpetuated 
because dealers are obliged to be involved in primary 
auctions and this concentrates distribution. This sometimes 
leads to dealers out-bidding investors at primary auctions. 
Since dealers have more incentive to compete for primary 
supply against their competitors in order to service their 
client base, investors are ‘crowded-out’ of the primary 
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market.
7 This simply reinforces the perception among 
investors that the most secure access to primary supply is 
through dealers and it further encourages them to maintain 
close links with a single primary dealer. It also makes the 
dealer system worthwhile for the issuer. Issuers obtain the 
benefit of lower cost borrowing when dealers have 
incentives to bid more competitively with each other for 
supply.
8 Many dealing banks claim that primary dealing 
itself is not profitable. This indicates the presence of other 
benefits arising from the maintenance of the client base. 
This situation can be more acute where issuers engage in 
syndicated issuance. This issuance strategy is used by many 
of the smaller sovereign issuers in Europe and some of its 
consequences have been analysed by Dunne et al. (2006). 
The main point is that lead-managership of syndicated 
issues is sometimes awarded to primary dealers who have 
been the most active participants of primary auctions and 
the most dedicated providers of liquidity in the secondary 
bond market. Since lead-managership of syndications is a 
directly profitable activity for dealers (involving relatively 
lucrative fees) their over-bidding at primary auctions is 
further encouraged since they bid in lieu of an additional 
expected reward.  
Syndicated issuance also enhances the position of dealers in 
the eyes of their clients and encourages them to reinforce 
their commitment to their dealer. It concentrates the supply 
of new issues among fewer dealers. It favours dealers with 
larger client bases and may lead to discriminatory 
distribution practices where smaller investors achieve less 
security of supply. Overall, syndicated issuance encourages 
opaque trading between dealers and their clients.  
The primary dealer system can also be credited with 
stymieing the growth of an electronic dealer-to-customer 
secondary market. This is because segmentation introduces 
a lag between the customer expressions of willingness to 
trade and order-execution. This time-lag becomes important 
if electronic trading modalities increase the speed with 
which trades in the dealer-to-customer segment of the 
market are made known to participants in the B2B segment. 
This encourages behaviour that is potentially damaging to 
market quality in one or other of the market segments. A 
good example of this is the relatively limited development 
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concern in the US Treasury market. This is not as likely to be as 
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greater number of primary dealers in Europe and a large number 
of sovereign issuers with different subsets of the dealer 
community participating in each market. Thus collusion is more 
difficult. There are currently 22 primary dealers operating in the 
US Treasury market that are listed as reporting to the issuer on the 
NY Federal Reserve’s website. In the eurozone there are 
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of multidealer-to-client request-for-quote (RFQ) electronic 
trading modalities in the dealer-to-customer bond market.
9 
Request for quote systems allow investors to request quotes 
from a number of dealers simultaneously. Dealers can 
respond to such requests very quickly and trades can be 
executed electronically. There are no significant B2C 
electronic order books, so pre-trade transparency of the 
B2B market must suffice as the best guide to prices that 
investors can expect to obtain in potential B2C trades. 
Investors can of course request quotes simply to gain pre-
trade information but investors can’t be sure that they are 
receiving the same information as other investors. It should 
also be noted that dealers do not generally know what 
prices are being quoted by other dealers (although on most 
RFQ platforms the under-bidder is informed that they 
quoted closest to the accepted price).  
RFQ systems are a significant improvement over voice 
communication in terms of ease and speed of trading. 
These platforms also bring dealers into direct competition 
with each other for client trades and this would be expected 
to deliver price improvement for investors. It could also be 
seen as a direct way of breaking down the clientele system. 
On the negative side however, RFQ platforms can pose 
problems for dealers who win automated RFQ auctions. 
Thus, despite the fact that these platforms have limited 
transparency, even this limited amount is potentially 
excessive when there is market segmentation. 
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose an 
investor approaches five dealers wanting to sell a large 
quantity of bonds. A request for bids is generated and 
regardless of their intentions to actually provide good 
prices, the dealers each have an incentive to prepare for the 
consequence of the B2C trade by engaging in offsetting 
activity in the B2B market. They are likely to do at least 
one of the following: i) place a sell order for immediate 
execution against the best bid limit-order on the electronic 
order-book, ii) place a limit-order to sell at a price that 
shades the best existing ask limit-order on the book or iii) 
remove or reduce the quantity of any limit-orders currently 
outstanding on the bid side of the order-book. 
All of these options are obvious responses to the customer 
trade even if the dealer concerned does not win the 
customer business. If the dealer wins the B2C auction, by 
selling in advance on the B2B market he is effectively 
hedging the position. Even if a dealer loses the B2C 
auction, by selling in advance in the B2B market he will 
have avoided any temporary price movement that may arise 
as a result of the trade. If a dealer reduces his exposure on 
the bid side of the book, he will be avoiding being ‘picked-
off’ at a price that may be worse than he could have 
achieved.  
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mainly consists of request-for-quote (RFQ) platforms, including 
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It is easy to see that the RFQ system has one critical 
disadvantage: namely, the delay between ‘requests’ and the 
actual implementation of a trade. When more than one 
dealer is involved, this delay allows for activity to take 
place in the B2B market in such a way that being the 
winner of a B2C order is not always beneficial. This 
‘winner’s curse’ problem has been examined by Dunne et 
al. (2006) and it highlights just one of the many problems 
that arise from the forced segmentation of the market.  
So far, RFQ systems have had limited penetration in the 
market for B2C liquidity provision but if they succeed in 
winning a more significant proportion this can be expected 
to undermine the clientele system and the presence of a 
winner’s curse is likely to diminish the importance of B2B 
platforms. Obligations placed by issuers on dealers to 
provide liquidity in the inter-dealer market is of course a 
countervailing force to this and perhaps accounts for the 
slow growth of RFQ platforms. 
To support this analysis, it is worth noting that monthly 
turnover in German and French benchmarks on the 
BondVision system is only about two-thirds of a percent of 
the amount issued. For Italy it is about 2.5% of issued 
benchmarks.
10 This is not high when one considers that 
B2B turnover on MTS is over 16% for Italy.  
It is also helpful to examine the size of trades conducted on 
RFQ systems with those on B2B platforms. Figure 1 at the 
end of this paper shows this comparison for the MTS B2B 
platform and the BondVision RFQ system. Although there 
are a small number of very large trades on the BondVision 
system, about 75% of all BondVision trades are smaller 
than the smallest trade size on the B2B platform. This 
reflects the excessive transparency of the RFQ system and 
the fact that this level of transparency does not easily 
accommodate large trades. 
Since the RFQ system does not provide pre-trade 
transparency, except on request, the information provided 
by the B2B segment must substitute. Thus, while the 
success of an RFQ trading system is at odds with the 
smooth running of the B2B electronic platform, the RFQ 
system itself cannot function very well without B2B 
transparency. A ‘catch-22’ for transparency regulators is 
therefore, that imposing increased transparency on B2C 
activity increases the risks and reduces the incentives for 
dealers to provide continuous liquidity in the inter-dealer 
market.  
Indeed, any form of transparent trading modality in the 
B2C segment (such as the introduction of a parallel 
electronic order-book) could represent a large threat to the 
efficient working of the B2B electronic trading system and 
this might in turn alter the entire structure and approach to 
primary issuance. However, the contrary argument also 
holds. The fact that issuers have favoured the continued 
health and transparency of the MTS B2B platform has 
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reduced the incentives for dealers to trade with customers 
in a transparent way. 
It is clear from the above discussion that: i) euro-
denominated sovereign bond markets suffer from an 
excessive degree of segmentation due mainly to the policies 
of sovereign issuers, ii) issuers have actively supported the 
development of a liquid inter-dealer market in euro-
denominated sovereign bonds but do not impose 
obligations on dealers to provide liquidity to end-investors 
in a transparent way,
11 iii) the B2B euro-denominated 
sovereign bond market is very transparent, iv) the B2C 
segment is mostly characterized by off-exchange OTC or 
RFQ modes of trading and these are not as transparent as 
regulators would like, v) B2B transparency is crucial to the 
efficiency of the non-transparent B2C market, vi) 
transparency cannot be imposed in the B2C segment 
without affecting the efficiency and liquidity of the B2B 
segment and vii) imposing further transparency 
requirements on the B2B segment is very likely to 
continually limit the development and growth of 
transparent B2C trading modalities. 
3. Going  forward 
Since excessive segmentation affects the quality of at least 
one part of this market, it is worth considering whether the 
market can be made to be less segmented. Given the 
already well developed nature of the B2B segment and the 
commitment of issuers to the primary dealer system, it 
seems reasonable to extend the reach of this segment so 
that it can encompass some B2C activity. This is the only 
way to fully circumvent problems such as the ‘winners 
curse’ associated with excessive post-trade transparency 
that arises when there is a two-stage approach to trading 
(B2C followed by B2B).  
There is therefore a case to be made for attempting to 
widen access to the B2B segment of the euro-denominated 
sovereign bond market. A complete opening of the B2B 
segment is not necessary. Small trades can still be 
accommodated using RFQ platforms without serious side-
effects in terms of investor protection or inventory risk for 
intermediaries. Very large trades in less liquid, ‘off-the-run’ 
bonds could also be better accommodated in an OTC 
setting where there is delayed post-trade transparency. But 
there is a significant proportion of investor trading, at least 
in the case of benchmark bonds, that could be 
accommodated on the existing B2B platforms.  
Widening access to the B2B platforms is not completely at 
odds with current developments. There is already a 
significant degree of investor involvement in the B2B 
segment of the US Treasury market. This is by way of 
algorithmic trading. Dealers in this market provide some of 
their customers with trading software that routes investor 
trades straight through to the inter-dealer eSpeed and 
BrokerTec markets. Since these are trades that may have 
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to customers in an off-exchange way. See the code of conduct for 
Belgian primary dealers (http://www.debtagency.be/Pdf/Code 
%20of%20duties%20PD.pdf). 
previously been done OTC, this development can be 
credited with improving the overall transparency of the 
market. Crucially, for the dealers and customers involved, 
there are mutual benefits associated with this development. 
Investors obviously value the fact that electronically 
assisted trading can manage trades while monitoring the 
state of the market in such a way that better execution 
outcomes are more often achieved. Investors also value the 
additional degree of autonomy they receive. Also, the lag 
between investor expressions of trading interest and the 
actual execution of trades is generally shortened.  
Dealers may also benefit because this arrangement helps in 
maintaining client loyalty. It generates other business as 
well as fee-income and assists in keeping position 
information ring-fenced. It also augments turnover statistics 
of the facilitating dealers and this can be beneficial for their 
relationship with the issuer. Furthermore, it transfers some 
dealer inventory risk directly to investors. More generally, 
benefits accrue to all market participants if this leads to 
increased liquidity.  
One potential drawback however, is that dealers can 
‘snoop’ on the algorithmic trading of their own clients and 
this might interfere with how they choose to transact other 
business that they are facilitating at the same time. 
Recently, in the case of euro-denominated sovereign bond 
markets, there have been calls from hedge funds to gain 
access to the MTS inter-dealer electronic platform.
12 From 
a market transparency point of view, allowing large, active 
investors direct access to the electronic inter-dealer market 
has many of the advantages associated with client-based 
algorithmic trading. It adds to the transparency of B2C 
trading and at the same time, generally, improves the 
efficiency and liquidity of the electronic order-book. Direct 
access for investors would also be more favourably looked 
upon by regulators than would the provision of algorithmic 
trading. This is because dealers would not be privy to the 
transactions being ‘worked’ by investors and they therefore 
would not be in a position to ‘front-run’ their own clients.  
Unfortunately, in the European context, it is not clear that 
mutual benefits would accrue to the parties most affected 
by this development. This is mainly because liquidity is 
supplied in the European inter-dealer market as a result of 
the onerous obligations that are placed on primary dealers. 
If investors are permitted to by-pass dealers completely 
then dealers will suffer reduced B2C turnover and this 
reduces the core activity upon which their B2B activity 
rests. Dealers are unlikely to be as keen to adhere to 
obligations if they cannot generate enough customer trades 
to warrant the risks involved in continuous liquidity 
provision.  
Dealers are indeed entitled to argue that access to the inter-
dealer market should be combined with obligations in just 
the same way that obligations apply to primary dealers. 
Hedge funds, or other end-investors, should not have all the 
benefits of access to this market without also being exposed 
to some of the risks associated with continuous liquidity 
                                                        
12 See the Financial Times, 10
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provision. Investor involvement in the inter-dealer market 
would also increase competition in this segment, and this 
may not be palatable for dealers.  
Given these considerations and the absence of fee-income 
and turnover attribution, there is little to recommend this 
development to dealers. Widening access might therefore 
appear to be a lost cause. However, in the case of the 
sovereign bond markets there are some obvious ways to 
address the concerns of primary dealers. Unlike almost all 
other markets, issuers have a lot of power over 
intermediaries and trading platforms in this case, and the 
effective use of this power has been well documented in 
Dunne et al. (2006). If issuers can be persuaded that 
transparency is worth improving, they could use their 
influence to alter trading platform management and provide 
incentives to dealers to acquiesce to investors wishes for 
more direct access to the B2B segment.  
One way to achieve this is to reduce, or eliminate, the 
quoting obligations of dealers on the inter-dealer trading 
platforms. This would answer the “no access without 
obligations” argument. The inter-dealer market is already 
very well established and it is probably not as heavily 
dependent on primary dealer obligations for its survival as 
it once was.  
Dealers quoting obligations should be replaced by 
alternative obligations relating to the percentage of investor 
trades that dealers facilitate in the B2B market. Facilitation 
should be defined in two distinct ways. The first way 
should be in terms of an ‘agency role’ played by dealers. 
Specifically, dealers who sponsor and route investor quotes 
to the B2B platform should obtain some recognition for this 
from issuers. The second way should be defined in terms of 
a ‘counterparty role’ played by dealers. In other words, 
dealers should be given credit by the issuer for the extent to 
which they act as counterparty to investor trades on the 
B2B market (i.e., by the ‘taking’ of investor offers or the 
‘hitting’ of investor bids).  
As a matter of practical importance, this proposal requires 
that ‘investor quotes’ are identified as such on the B2B 
platforms. This could be achieved by colour-coding them. 
There is no need to reveal the identity of investors making 
the limit-prices or the dealers sponsoring them. And this 
proposal does not require any change to the time priority 
rules applying to the queuing of orders. 
Since investors would only be able to access the inter-
dealer market by being sponsored by a particular dealer, 
this would maintain the clientele system that is so valuable 
to investors, dealers and issuers during primary 
distributions. If issuers place obligations on primary dealers 
to provide this type of facilitation of investor quotes, they 
can encourage increased liquidity provision, contribute to a 
healthy clientele system and achieve significant 
improvements in market transparency. 
With the proper trading platform design, where investor 
limit-orders are visible as such, dealers could compete with 
each other to trade more often with investors than with each 
other. This trading could be given a high weight in dealer 
turnover statistics. The reward for high turnover with 
investors can then be given in the form of privileged access 
to primary auctions and conversion facilities as well as 
increased likelihood of participation in syndicated issuance. 
By changing the weight applied to this turnover, the 
rewards could be modified progressively towards a level 
that encourages what is viewed by issuers (or the regulator) 
as an optimal level of investor activity in the transparent 
segment. These changes are also likely to reduce trading 
costs and the time it takes to execute orders. 
Changes of this type are inherently complex and their side-
effects are difficult to predict. A cautious approach would 
therefore need to be taken. The main point however, is that 
issuers (in consultation with dealers and the electronic 
trading platforms) have the power to provide incentives to 
intermediaries that could bring about significant 
improvements in both transparency and liquidity. 
Ultimately, the modifications being proposed here involve 
dealers competing with each other, not just to maintain 
their client base, but also for investor transactions in a 
transparent setting.  
There are probably many ways that the general principle 
underlying this proposal could be put into effect and it 
would be possible to move in this direction over time in a 
protracted way so that there is time for adjustment. This 
proposal is likely to require minor changes in trading 
platform design. Issuers, dealers and trading platform 
providers would be well-placed to agree the specific details 
of such changes and there is good reason to suspect that the 
major trading platforms would be capable of monitoring the 
performance of dealers and coping with the increased level 
of participation that these proposals would require. 
4. Conclusion 
The segmented nature of the euro-denominated sovereign 
bond markets provides an immediate obstacle to the 
application of MiFID-style transparency initiatives. 
Strategies for the distribution of bonds through primary 
dealers have encouraged clientele-building and opaque 
dealer-to-customer trading modalities.  
A relatively straightforward proposal is made here that has 
the potential to reduce market segmentation. It is argued 
that this would improve the kind of transparency that 
matters for investor protection in the spirit of MiFID. 
However, it is admitted that this would rely on providing 
sufficient motivation to primary dealers to provide liquidity 
to investors by widening access to the inter-dealer segment 
of the market. It is argued that European sovereign issuers 
have the power and influence to achieve this outcome. One 
way to view this proposal is as a call for a reorientation of 
obligations and incentives to bring about a reduced 
segmentation of the market and a spreading of the burden 
of liquidity provision across a wider group of market 
participants. It is argued that this would improve all aspects 
of the sovereign bond market that matter to investors, 
dealers, issuers and regulators without inflicting significant 
damage to any of them. 8 | Peter G. Dunne 
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Figure 1. Quantile by trade size in dealer-to-customer (BondVision) and dealer-to-dealer (MTS) 
segments of the euro-denominated bond market 
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